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2001 Panel Discussion on Current Issues 
in Trademark Law – I’ll See Your Two 
Pesos and Raise You . . . Two Pesos,    
Wal-Mart . . . and TrafFix: Where is U.S. 
Supreme Court Jurisprudence Heading, 
and How Will it Affect Trademark 
Practitioners? 
Moderator:     Hugh Hansen* 
Panelists:        Glenn Mitchell** 
                       Inna Fayenson*** 
                       Perry Saidman**** 
                       
 MR. GALBRAITH: Good evening.  I’m Kevin Galbraith, 
incoming Editor-in-Chief of the Fordham Intellectual Property, 
Media & Entertainment Law Journal.   On behalf of the entire 
Journal, welcome to tonight’s panel discussion, which we are 
proud to co-sponsor with the Trademark Law Committee of the 
New York State Bar Association.1 
Through discussion amongst the panelists and attendees, we seek 
to shed light on the evolving jurisprudence in trade dress and to 
explore how it might affect practitioners. 
Thank you all for coming. 
 
 
 *  Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.  Rutgers University, B.A. 
1968; Georgetown University, J.D. 1972; Yale University School of Law, LL.M. 1977. 
 **  Special Counsel, Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP.  Wesleyan University, B.A. 
1984; St. John’s University, J.D. 1987 (cum laude). 
 ***  Partner, Kronish Lieb Weiner & Hellman LLP.  Columbia University (Barnard 
College), B.A. 1985 (magna cum laude); Harvard University, J.D. 1988 (cum laude). 
 ****  Principal, Saidman Design Law Group.  George Washington University, B.S.E.E. 
1967; University of Pennsylvania, M.S.E.E. 1968; George Washington University, J.D. 
1973 (with honors). 
 1  This discussion was held on April 2, 2001, in the McNally Amphitheatre at 
Fordham University School of Law.  Footnotes were provided by the Fordham 
Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal. 
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It is now my pleasure to introduce John Feerick, Dean of 
Fordham University School of Law. 
DEAN FEERICK: Thank you very much. 
I just want to say how pleased our school is to have this 
opportunity to co-sponsor a program on current issues in the field 
of trademark law with the State Bar’s Trademark Law Committee, 
and I want to acknowledge our gratitude to Peter Sloane and the 
members of the Committee for the opportunity to do this. 
If there is one challenge that is out there, that a program like this 
deals with, it is to have more discussions involving the academic 
community and the practicing bar.  It is something that there has 
been a lot of discussions going on about among bar leaders and law 
school deans across the country.  I think it is wonderful here in 
New York that the State Bar and its various committees are doing 
programs in the law schools, and I am very grateful on behalf of 
our school to the leadership of the Trademark Law Committee, in 
particular. 
I want to express my gratitude to all the panelists, to the 
moderator, Professor Hugh Hansen of our faculty, and I want to 
thank the students of the Law School for their own energy that 
makes possible programs such as the one tonight. 
I know you will have a very interesting discussion on Supreme 
Court jurisprudence dealing with trademark, which brings me back 
to my own days as a practicing lawyer, some thirty years ago, 
when I had some trademark litigation matters, and worked pretty 
hard to settle them all. 
So all the best for a very good program and thank you so much 
for being here. 
MR. GALBRAITH: Thank you, Dean Feerick, and thank you to 
all the panelists.  We are very happy to have you here.  You are a 
distinguished group, and I know we will have an interesting 
discussion. 
Hugh Hansen, this evening’s moderator, is a Professor of Law at 
Fordham University, where he has been teaching since 1978.  For 
the past nine years, Professor Hansen has hosted an annual 
conference on the state of international intellectual property law 
and policy here at Fordham.  The website for the conference is 
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www.fordhamipconference.com.  The Journal is grateful for 
Professor Hansen’s guidance. 
With that, let’s begin.  Professor Hansen. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Thank you, Kevin, and congratulations 
to you and the other members of the Journal for putting together 
another very good program with excellent panelists.  I am certainly 
honored to have been asked to be a part of it. 
Kevin asked me to just start off with a little bit of an introduction 
to the topic. 
I think trade dress protection is an interesting aspect of 
intellectual property law.  Intellectual property law is generally 
interesting and through various developments has attracted the 
attention of the public, business and the Supreme Court.  The 
Court is taking more intellectual property cases than ever before in 
its history. 
Historically, trademark law has been a backwater, or more 
charitably, a boutique area of the law.  Not many lawyers practiced 
it and few law schools taught it.  The consuming public was not 
aware of marks and brands as such.  Personal knowledge of the 
seller was sufficient in our small-town economy to protect and 
inform the consumer.  Trademark law then, as it does now, 
reflected the nature of the market place and the needs of consumers 
and sellers.2 
Early trademark law was rigid protecting only “technical 
marks.”3  Consumers were not thought to see source identification 
in anything but fanciful and arbitrary marks.4  The seller who 
objected to another seller’s confusing marketing was often left to 
the law of unfair competition,5 where justice would be done on an 
ad hoc basis.  Common law courts required intent to deceive or 
passing off, not expecting likelihood of confusion, unless the 
defendant had taken actions to achieve confusion. 
 
 2 See generally 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 5:2 (4th 
ed. 1996) (discussing the development of trademark in Anglo-American common law). 
 3 See generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 5:3 (discussing the history of United 
States trademark legislation). 
 4 See generally id. 
 5 See generally id. at § 5:2. 
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As markets became regional and then national, and new products 
were introduced into the marketplace, advertising was needed to 
inform the consumer about who was producing a product and its 
quality.  As people became more aware of brands and the need to 
search for source identifiers for non-locally produced products, 
trademark law expanded the subject matter it protected.  For 
instance, courts created the doctrine of “suggestive” marks as a 
way to prevent likelihood of confusion without the need for the 
plaintiff to prove intent to deceive.6 
As consumer awareness and sophistication about the nature of 
marks and brands increased, courts continued to expand what 
would be protected as a source identifier by trademark law.  As a 
result, today, there is little need for the law of unfair competition 
since full protection is available against junior users under 
trademark law,7 unlike the law in the United Kingdom,8 Germany,9 
and other countries where unfair competition law remains 
important. 
The area of trade dress protection mirrors the growth of 
trademark law in general.  Originally, trade dress protection was 
left to the law of unfair competition.  Courts did not see consumers 
as easily treating trade dress, usually packaging, as a source 
identifier, just as they had not seen consumers treating non-
technical marks as source indicators.  Thus, courts required 
plaintiffs to prove secondary meaning before finding protectable 
trade dress.10  
Trade dress protection is more controversial than protection for 
marks as it affects the discretion of how competitors present their 
product to the public, not just what they may call themselves or 
their products.  In addition, the Supreme Court in the 1930s, 1940s, 
1950s, and 1960s was suspicious of intellectual property law in 
general, and trademark law in particular.  The Warren Court 
 
 6 See generally id. at § 11:4 (discussing the nature of inherently distinctive marks). 
 7 See generally id. at § 1:8 (discussing unfair competition and its relationship to 
trademark). 
 8 See generally 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 29:35 (discussing European 
Trademark Law and Policy). 
 9 See generally id. 
 10 See generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 1.8. 
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indicated its hostility in Sears11 and Compco12 where it broadly 
held there was federal preemption of state trademark protection for 
three-dimensional marks and state law was preempted whenever 
there would be public confusion.13  This was consistent with the 
Court’s belief that intellectual property law – and specifically 
trademark law – was anti-competitive, a monopoly of sorts that 
should be limited.14 
This negative approach has since been rejected by the U.S. 
Department of Justice (the “DOJ”) and by the courts, in part as a 
result of the growth and influence of the Chicago School of Law 
and Economics analysis.15  Modern approaches to law and 
economics view trademarks as a cornerstone of competition in the 
marketplace, and competition concerns should be dealt with by 
fine-tuning trademark law not by broadly limiting what may be 
protected. 
With this new approach, trade dress was viewed not as 
inherently antithetical to sound policy, but rather something that 
should be protected when it serves as a source identifier.16  If trade 
dress does serve as a source identifier and it is not protected, there 
will be consumer confusion and the owner’s goodwill will be 
subject to free riding by competitors.  So we see growth in 
protection of trade dress,17 especially packaging trade dress,18 
which is considered less anticompetitive. 
 
 11 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964). 
 12 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964). 
 13 See Sears, Roebuck, 376 U.S. at 231-232, Compco, 376 U.S. at 238. 
 14 See Sears, Roebuck, 376 U.S. at 230, Compco, 376 U.S. at 238. 
 15 See generally 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 
227 (1998)  
The distinctive approach associated with [the Chicago School of Law and 
Economics is a] willingness of members of the school to accept as a working 
hypothesis that humans act rationally when making choices, including making 
choices about how to respond to the legal system, that market determined 
outcomes are consistent with social welfare, and that government intervention 
in market processes is in most cases unlikely to advance social welfare. 
Id. 
 16 See generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, §§ 3:8-9 (discussing the role of source 
identification in trademark law). 
 17 See generally 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, Section III, Ch. 7 (discussing the nature 
and evolution of trade dress in product and container shapes). 
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In line with this new approach, some courts removed the 
requirement that trade dress needed secondary meaning to be 
protected.  The Supreme Court adopted this position in Two 
Pesos19 in 1992.  Justice White treated the issue as an easy one, 
without any indication of the reasons for past suspicion of trade 
dress protection.   Trade dress should be treated no differently from 
any other source indicator.  Trade dress was capable of being 
inherently distinctive and did not per se need secondary meaning.  
Unlike in Sears and Compco, there was no concern in Two Pesos 
about the anti-competitive effects of trademark protection. 
The Court again addressed trade dress protection in Qualitex20 in 
1995, where it held that the single color of a product could be 
protected under trademark law.  Justice Breyer’s opinion in 
Qualitex reads like an ode to the value of trademarks.  He sets forth 
the various reasons why protection of trademarks is beneficial and 
rejects an approach that excludes per se certain things from the 
subject matter of trademark.21  Everything should be subject to 
trademark protection, and then, if there is a competitive problem, 
courts should use the functionality defense on an ad hoc basis to 
resolve any possible anticompetitive effects of protection.22  
Trademark protection is, so to speak, the default drive and 
anticompetitive concerns should be addressed on a micro basis in  
fact-specific situations where applicable.23 
There is dicta in Qualitex that a single color can never be 
inherently distinctive.  This derives not because of any 
anticompetitive concerns about protection but because Justice 
Breyer says, incorrectly in my view, that color only describes the 
product and, thus, can never be inherently distinctive.24  In fact, a 
single color can be inherently distinctive.  A red top of a bolt, for 
instance, would undeniably be an inherently distinctive way of 
identifying one’s brand of bolts. 
 
 18 See generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, §§ 7:53-54 (discussing the nature and 
evolution of state and federal protection of trade dress in product shape). 
 19 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
 20 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995). 
 21 See id. at 172-73. 
 22 See id. at 169-70. 
 23 See id. 
 24 See id. at 162-63. 
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The Court’s concern with the possible anticompetitive effects of 
trade dress can be seen in two recent “product-design” cases.  Wal-
Mart25 presented the issue of how to determine whether a product 
configuration or design can be inherently distinctive.  TrafFix,26 
presented the issue of whether a utility patent prevented any trade 
dress protection for the product design after the patent expired.   In 
both, the facts presented weak cases for protection and this may 
have influenced the Court. 
Wal-Mart involved a clothes maker’s designs of children’s 
clothes that contained certain consistent features.  The clothes 
maker wanted protection for a family of products, thereby 
increasing the concern for anticompetitive effects of protection.  
The basic look of the clothes was attractive, so much so that Wal-
Mart ordered a copy-cat design for its children’s clothing line.   
Wal-Mart was an unfortunate case to present the trade dress 
issue to the Court since (i) it seemed doubtful that, in fact, 
consumers saw the design as a source indicator, and (ii) it looked 
like additional protection because Wal-Mart was also held liable 
for copyright infringement and was subject to an injunction and 
damages regardless of the outcome of the trade dress issue.  The 
district court judge obviously viewed Wal-Mart as a bad guy and 
issued a very broad injunction.27  The Second Circuit affirmed the 
holding of liability but narrowed the injunction.28  The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari on the issue of what test should be used to 
determine whether the product design trade dress was inherently 
distinctive. 
There were many amicus curiae including the DOJ and the 
International Trademark Association (“INTA”).  The plaintiff and 
all the amici proposed tests to determine whether the design was 
inherently distinctive.  The DOJ and INTA urged the Court to 
adopt a test used by the Federal Circuit first devised when it was 
 
 25 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000). 
 26 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1255 (2001). 
 27 See Samara Brothers, Inc. v. Judy-Philippine, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997). 
 28 See Samara Brothers, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 165 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.29  Only Wal-Mart 
argued that product design trade dress should always require 
secondary meaning.30 
The Supreme Court, showing its independence did not follow 
the DOJ, whose amicus arguments it normally examines very 
carefully in intellectual property (“IP”) cases; INTA;31 the Federal 
Circuit, which, after all, is “the IP court;” or any other court that 
considered the issue.  Instead, the Court determined that in all 
situations product design trade dress requires proof of secondary 
meaning to be protected. 
The Court was concerned about the anticompetitive 
consequences of protecting product designs that do not actually 
serve as source indicators.  This might have been one of those 
situations yet two respected courts, the Southern District of New 
York and the Second Circuit, both held that the clothing designs 
were inherently distinctive.  In oral argument, the Court asked the 
Deputy Solicitor General why this design was inherently 
distinctive.  He replied that the DOJ was not taking a position on 
whether the design was inherently distinctive, and instead was only 
concerned with what test should be used.32 
Unlike Wal-Mart, the threat of a lawsuit might stop some 
competitors from using a particular trade dress because of the 
transaction costs involved in defending a lawsuit, leaving the 
public without competition for a design that does not serve as a 
source indicator.  In short, the first company to use a design that 
became popular could use claims of trade dress protection to 
suppress competition.  It was not surprising that, on the facts of 
this case, the Court would have these concerns.  Moreover, the 
Court did not have to worry about large retailers such as Wal-Mart 
 
 29 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae for Petitioner at 17-18, Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (No. 99-150). 
 30 See Brief for Petitioner at 10, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 
U.S. 205 (2000) (No. 99-150). 
 31 See Brief of the International Trademark Association in Support of Neither Party, 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (No. 99-150). 
 32 See generally Transcript of Proceedings at 17-18, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara 
Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000) (No. 99-150); 2000 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 20. 
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stealing designs on attractive clothing as copyright law was 
available to provide protection. 
TrafFix, decided this Term, presented another fact pattern for 
neutrally bringing the issue of trade dress before the Court.  The 
plaintiff had a utility patent on a road sign with protection for the 
configuration of the legs supporting the stand.  After the patent 
expired, it sued a competitor that copied the configuration.  It 
claimed that there was secondary meaning in the design, and thus a 
likelihood of consumer confusion when the defendant used the 
design.  This was highly unlikely for two reasons.  First, secondary 
meaning was doubtful.  Second, the buyers of the signs were not 
members of the public but rather sophisticated people in 
construction.  The case was presented to the Court as an expired 
patent holder using trademark law to extend its patent.   
The District Court had dismissed the case holding that trade 
dress was not permissible per se because of the expired utility 
patent.33  The Sixth Circuit reversed34 and the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.35 
This time, the Solicitor General’s Office of the DOJ, which had 
been relying on the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) in 
past IP cases, did not use the PTO but rather used the Antitrust 
Division.  This only makes sense if the Solicitor General’s Office 
had already determined that the anticompetitive aspects 
outweighed any intellectual property concerns – something 
difficult for the lay lawyers in the Solicitor General’s Office who 
had little background in either area of the law.  Perhaps, it was 
because the Solicitor General’s Office felt burned after Wal-Mart 
when its views were ignored by a Court that signaled its concern 
with anticompetitive effects of product design protection. 
They came up with the idea that it should be a per se test:36  If 
there has been a utility patent, trade dress protection is never 
 
 33 Marketing Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Mich. 
1997). 
 34 Marketing Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 35 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 530 U.S. 1260 (2001). 
 36 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 12-
13&19-20, TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 530 U.S. 1260 (2001) (No. 
99-1571). 
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available – a throwback to the 1950s and 1960s Warren Court 
analysis. 
Fortunately, the Court did not adopt the Solicitor General’s 
argument, however it did show that it is very concerned about this 
protection for product configuration.  The Court rejected the 
mainstream test for so-called “functionality” that provides 
protection for trade dress that is a source indicator unless such 
protection prevents “effective competition.” – a test Judge Posner 
created in the Seventh Circuit37 and which has since been adopted 
elsewhere.  Likewise, it rejected the Federal Circuit’s idea of de 
jure functionality and de facto functionality,38 which also indicates 
that trade dress may serve a utilitarian function and still be 
protected.  Rather, it went back to dictum in Inwood Laboratories39 
– that if trade dress affects the cost or quality of a product it may 
not be protected. 
The Court indicated a hostility to product design trade dress 
protection not seen before.  It also indicated it might adopt the 
DOJ’s per se test: 
[I]f in fact the federal courts applying our standard 
give de facto patent utility protection to trade dress, 
we will consider the issue we are reserving now 
whether it is a per se rule, that once something has 
been granted a utility patent, it will be barred 
forever from being protectable trade dress.40 
So, it appears that product configuration trade dress faces a 
tough road when there has been a utility patent granted. 
We will leave it now to the panelists to tell us in more detail 
what has happened and what will happen, and then we will open 
the floor to discussion with the audience and among the panelists. 
 
 37 See Judith Beth Prowda, The Trouble with Trade Dress Protection of Product 
Design, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1309, 1345-1355 (1998) (discussing the “Seventh Circuit Rule” 
and its evolution). 
 38 See generally Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844 
(1982). 
 39 Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 
(1982). 
 40 See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 164-67. 
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Glenn Mitchell from Stroock & Stroock & Lavan will be our 
first speaker.  He is going to discuss the issue of distinctiveness 
from Two Pesos to the Wal-Mart cases. 
MR. MITCHELL: Thank you. 
We all know that there are countless products that we recognize 
just by the packaging or the shape of the product itself, even when 
we cannot see the label, when we are too far away to see the label: 
anything from the classic Coca-Cola bottle; to the Rolls-Royce 
grille; to a different kind of grill, the Weber barbecue kettle, which 
is recognizable – at least to those of us who grew up in the 
suburbs; or the Pepperidge Farm Goldfish for those of us who have 
had kids or have been kids.  As such, these items do indicate their 
source and, therefore, function as trademarks.41  They represent the 
goodwill of the manufacturers, allowing consumers to 
automatically distinguish the Goldfish crackers from crackers 
made by other companies, or the Rolls-Royce from a Jaguar or 
another car. 
Generally, as with most of these products, the association is built 
up over time through the popularity of sales, through advertising 
and other media attention.  Until about nine years ago, when the 
Supreme Court decided Two Pesos, ushering in what I will call 
“the Golden Age of Trade Dress,” many courts, notably the Second 
Circuit, required rigorous proof of this association – known as 
secondary meaning – before they would grant protection to trade 
dress.42 
Two Pesos, as Professor Hansen mentioned, was a case that 
involved competing Mexican restaurants, in which the junior user 
copied many of the design aspects of the plaintiff’s Mexican 
restaurants,43 going above and beyond simply having a sombrero 
on the wall, which I think would be considered functional, or at 
least necessary to give the flavor of a Mexican restaurant. 
 
 41 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 4:12 (discussing the evolution of modern 
“trademark”); see also Glenn Mitchell, In Samara Brothers, Supreme Court Brings 
Second Circuit Full Circle on the Protectibility of Product Design as Trade Dress, 9 
NYSBA BRIGHT IDEAS 2 (Fall 2000) (containing a detailed discussion of Mr. Mitchell’s 
views on this subject matter). 
 42 See generally Willajeanne F. McLean, The Birth, Death, and Renaissance of the 
Doctrine of Secondary Meaning in the Making, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 737, 753-57 (1993). 
 43 See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 765-66. 
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Two Pesos came to the attention of the Supreme Court due to a 
split in the circuits, with the Second Circuit requiring secondary 
meaning, while other circuits, notably the Fifth Circuit, allowed 
protection of inherently distinctive trade dress.44 
The reasoning in Two Pesos was that the Lanham Act45 protects 
any “word, term, name, symbol, or device,”46 and does not make 
any distinctions between or among those different categories.47  
Therefore, since trademarks can be protected if they are inherently 
distinctive and automatically identify a source, then so can trade 
dress. 
Two Pesos came up to the Supreme Court only on the issue of 
whether inherently distinctive trade dress could be protected, not, 
“How do we determine inherently distinctive trade dress?”48  All 
the Court said in that regard was that the jury instructions, which 
followed the Abercrombie & Fitch standard49 that trade dress, like 
trademarks, can be “arbitrary, descriptive, or generic,” were 
appropriate instructions in that case.50 
Over time, however, the different courts that went on to interpret 
Two Pesos had to decide how to define trade dress, and many 
courts found that the Abercrombie standard just did not cut it.51  It 
is very difficult to describe the look of packaging or the look of a 
product as descriptive or suggestive.  Some courts use the Federal 
Circuit’s Seabrook standard,52 which inquires whether the trade 
dress was a “common basic shape or design, whether it was unique 
or unusual in a particular field, whether it was a mere refinement 
of a commonly adopted and well-known form of ornamentation for 
a particular class of goods, viewed by the public as a dress or 
 
 44 See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 767, referencing Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary 
Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 702 (5th Cir. 1981) and Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. 
New Body Boutique, Inc., 652 F.2d 299 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 45 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129 (1997 and 1999 Supplement).  Also referred to as the 
Trademark Act of 1946.  See also Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768-69. 
 46 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (1997 and 1999 Supplement). 
 47 See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768-69. 
 48 See generally Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 767. 
 49 See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768; Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 
537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 50 See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at, 770. 
 51 See generally Michelle A. Shpetner, Note, Determining a Proper Test for Inherent 
Distinctiveness in Trade Dress, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 949, 981-
1001 (1998). 
 52 See Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-well Foods, Inc., 568 F.2d 1342 (C.C.P.A. 1977).   
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ornamentation for the goods.”53 
Now, this sounds good, but how does one apply it?  Ultimately, 
and since I go first, I get to say this ahead of my colleagues, the 
courts, faced with inherent distinctiveness, decided that they “knew 
it when they saw it.” 
That is not to say that there are not standards.  Some 
commentators have come up with ways of going about looking at 
trade dress, including looking at the industry to determine whether 
a design was something that was used as an indicator of source.54 
An example that I like to use is guitars.  The musicians among 
us that see guitars often know by the headstock whether it is a 
Fender, a Gibson, a Kramer, or some other brand, and we can tell 
that from far away.  The designers, while they want to make the 
guitar look and sound good – purely aesthetic or functional 
considerations – also want to have that identification there.  The 
first guys that did it, that probably was not inherently distinctive.  
They did it, they carved it, and ultimately it became their signature.  
But now that is a part of the industry, if you see a new guitar with a 
new and different headstock, you are going to say, “I wonder who 
makes those.”  So, there are ways that through development of 
industry customs and consumer reaction thereto, product design 
factors can be inherently distinctive. 
The big problem that the courts faced as they went along, was 
the difference between packaging and product design.55  Most 
courts agree that packaging is generally created partly to be eye-
catching, and partly to be source-identifying.56  Some courts also 
recognized that products are not all looked at in the same way as 
packaging, and that the standard of proving inherent 
distinctiveness is much tougher.57 
Some of the courts said: “No, the Supreme Court simply did not 
make any distinctions; they said we must follow Abercrombie.”58  
 
 53 See id. at 1344. 
 54 See supra note 51; see also Glenn Mitchell, Rose Auslander, Trade Dress 
Protection: Will a Statutorily Unified Standard Result in a Functionally Superior 
Solution?, 88 TRADEMARK REP. 472, 500 (1998). 
 55 See supra note 51. 
 56 See id. 
 57 See id. 
 58 See id. 
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Other courts, notably the Second and Third Circuits, have 
recognized the inadequacies of applying a single standard both to 
packaging and product configuration, saying “[w]e have to face 
reality.  Yes, inherently distinctive product design is protectable, 
but the test to determine whether consumers actually view a 
product design as an indicator of source without secondary 
meaning is much tougher.”59  In fact, their tests set the bar very, 
very high, so high that virtually no product designs could pass, but 
theoretically some could. 
That brings us to Wal-Mart.  As Professor Hansen said, this was 
a case that involved a small children’s clothing company named 
Samara Brothers, that had a line of baby clothes featuring certain 
relatively consistent design elements: They had lace around the 
top, many of them had appliqués sewn on to them.  It was a line of 
clothes and there was testimony that there was a “Samara look.”  
Wal-Mart saw it, Wal-Mart liked it, Wal-Mart decided they could 
sell a whole lot of these a whole lot cheaper, and contracted with 
somebody to do just that. 
At the district court level, Wal-Mart lost on all grounds.60  The 
jury found against it on copyright infringement and trade dress 
infringement grounds,61 finding that the line of goods was 
inherently distinctive, and although it is not really clear from the 
history, there were enough facts there that I think they could have 
found secondary meaning as well.  Nevertheless, what happened 
was that the jury said this was “Big Bad Wal-Mart” and they were 
copying, and we have all been taught from a young age that 
copying is just plain bad. 
In fact, I think Judge Chin, in his decision denying Wal-Mart’s 
request for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, agreed with Wal-
Mart that there was no protectable trade dress, but Judge Chin had 
respect for the jury, felt it was enough of a case to get to the jury, 
and let the verdict stand.62 
 
 
 
 59 See id. 
 60 See Samara Brothers, Inc. v. Judy-Philippine, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 895 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997). 
 61 See id. at 896-97. 
 62 See id. at 895. 
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On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed, with a dissent by Judge 
Newman,63 who I think was the one judge on the whole case that 
really got it right.  Judge Newman found that the trade dress at 
issue just did not meet the standard of inherent distinctiveness.64  
He also cautioned against leaving too much for the jury.65  As a 
plaintiff’s lawyer, if I had that case, I would want it before a jury.  
I would want to show copying. 
But when I read the trade-dress jury instructions in Wal-Mart – 
and I have been practicing in this area for over a decade – even I 
found them confusing.  Judge Newman said that in these kinds of 
cases, complex antitrust cases or copyright or trademark cases, 
courts should be very careful to make sure that the jury is finding 
fact and not deciding mixed questions of fact and law.66 
The Supreme Court reversed, as Professor Hansen said, and in 
fact the question for certiorari did not even anticipate the 
possibility that product configuration trade dress could not be 
inherently distinctive.  The question was: “What do you have to 
show?”67 
Wal-Mart, nevertheless, argued in their briefs that no product 
configuration trade dress is protectable,68 and the Supreme Court 
agreed.69  In order to do that, I think they had to turn the reasoning 
of Two Pesos on its head.  Whereas Two Pesos said: “We can’t not 
protect inherently distinctive trade dress because the Lanham Act 
70 does not allow us to make that distinction,”71 in Wal-Mart 
Justice Scalia said, “We can decide that product configuration 
trade dress cannot be inherently distinctive because the Lanham 
Act does not say we cannot.”72 
 
 63 See Samara Brothers, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 165 F.3d 120, 133 (2d Cir. 
1998). 
 64 See Samara Brothers, at 165 F.3d at 133-137. 
 65 See id. at 135-137. 
 66 See id. 
 67 See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 207. 
 68 See Brief for Petitioner at 10, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 
U.S. 205 (2000) (No. 99-150). 
 69 See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 212. 
 70 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129 (1997 and 1999 Supplement).  Also referred to as the 
Trademark Act of 1946. 
 71 See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 774 (“It would be a different matter if there were 
textual basis in § 43(a) for treating inherently distinctive verbal or symbolic trademarks 
differently from inherently distinctive trade dress but there is none”). 
 72 See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 210. 
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So I think they got it backwards for a couple of reasons. 
As Professor Hansen said, the Court may have found comfort in 
the fact that there was a copyright judgment below, and the Court 
held that where you do have situations of trade dress that would 
otherwise be distinctive, copyright protection or design patents are 
available.73  As a practical matter, that is often not true.  First, 
although copyright protects works of authorship, including visual 
and sculptural works, it does not protect things that are defined as 
useful items, no matter how distinctive, creative or innovative. 
Second, for the small guy who is coming up with the innovative 
products and does not have the legal sophistication or the 
wherewithal to start applying for design patents on every new item 
that may or may not be successful, that is just not realistic. 
So, in the guise of trying to prevent anticompetitive strike suits, 
and, at least on its face, in fact trying to protect the little guy, I 
think the Supreme Court is actually going to make it much more 
difficult for new entrants into the market to gain a foothold by 
coming up with some way of distinguishing their products by 
design from those of other producers.  The example used in the 
decision was the cocktail shaker shaped like a penguin.74  Yes, it 
was designed to be an attractive item.  It was also designed as a 
way to distinguish this cocktail shaker that I am selling from all 
other cocktail shakers. 
Also, the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart, I think, really flouted 
congressional intent.  In 1982, Two Pesos was decided.  Courts 
assumed that inherently distinctive trade dress, including product 
configuration, was protectable.75  Congress did not see fit to 
change that.  In 1998, they introduced legislation that would have 
codified the standard for trade dress.76  That never came to a 
vote.77  Now, with Two Pesos, maybe that legislation will come 
back. 
 
 
 73 See id. at 214. 
 74 See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 213. 
 75 See supra note 51. 
 76 See H.R. 3163, 105th Cong. (2d Sess. 1988) (extension of remarks of Hon. 
Howard Coble); see also Mitchell, supra note 41. 
 77 See H.R. 3163, § 2(g), 105th Cong. (2d Sess. 1988); see also Mitchell, supra note 
41. 
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Finally, I want to explore one other aspect.  Many people might 
look at Wal-Mart and say, “You know what?  We haven’t got a 
claim here anymore.”  However, there is an old adage that where 
there is a wrong, there is a remedy.  In the dark days before Two 
Pesos was decided, the Second Circuit, or at least district courts 
within the Second Circuit, when faced with predatory conduct, 
such as copying a distinctive novelty telephone design and the like, 
embraced the concept of “secondary meaning in the making.”78  
That doctrine held that if a junior user came in and copied some 
product before it had the chance to become famous and to develop 
secondary meaning – such conduct was wrongful and the junior 
user would be enjoined.79 
The Second Circuit and Federal Circuit ultimately rejected that 
doctrine,80 and then it was mooted by Two Pesos.  Nevertheless, in 
a similar situation, courts will likely find some way to redress the 
wrong, just as the jury in Wal-Mart sensed that there was 
something that just smelled bad and threw the book at Wal-Mart. 
Another way that the courts might go forward on this would be 
to resurrect the presumption that when there is copying, that is a 
sign that there is in fact secondary meaning, that the junior user 
would not have copied if there were not secondary meaning. 
In either of these cases, courts doing equity by finding a remedy 
would be creating bad law.  The courts should somehow get back 
to protecting inherently distinctive product design and leave the 
rest up to the House of Representatives and the Senate. 
Thank you. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Thank you, Glenn. 
Our next speaker is Inna Fayenson from Kronish Lieb Weiner & 
Hellman, who will talk to us about the functionality doctrine. 
MS. FAYENSON: Thank you, Professor Hansen.  My topic 
tonight is functionality, or the requirement of non-functionality for 
trade dress protection.  But the more general thesis of my talk is 
that, looking at the Two Pesos/Wal-Mart/TrafFix line of decisions, 
 
 78 See, e.g., supra note 42 at 760; Cicena, Ltd. v. Columbia Telecommunications 
Group, 900 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (applying Second Circuit law). 
 79 See supra note 42. 
 80 See id. 
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what we see is a Supreme Court really struggling with product 
configuration trade dress, so that, and as I think the other panelists 
agree, the Court comes to the right decisions on the facts, but 
reading the opinions closely, we see that the Court’s reasoning is 
all over the place.  The Court mixes and matches doctrines and 
justifications and distinguishes its own precedents just to get to the 
ultimate decision on the facts.  The result, in my view, is that by 
doing so, the Court in the last couple of years has created even 
more uncertainty in the area of trade dress.  The one message that 
is clear from the Wal-Mart and TrafFix decisions is that the Court 
is cutting back on trade dress protection.  But unfortunately, there 
is no coherence to the Court’s method of doing so. 
In fairness to the Supreme Court, what I think this illustrates is 
that we do not have a coherent, satisfying, theoretical foundation 
for protecting product configuration trade dress and for defining 
the proper boundaries of that protection.  Since I am coming from 
the practitioner’s perspective, what this means is that we are not 
going to have meaningful predictability, which is extremely 
important in the real world, until either someone comes up with a 
satisfactory coherent theory, or someone – Congress, I suppose – 
makes an explicit policy decision setting the standards for 
protecting product configuration trade dress. 
Just to clarify, when I am talking about a lack of predictability, I 
don’t mean that every product design case is unpredictable, what I 
mean is that after Two Pesos/Wal-mart/TrafFix, there will be many 
difficult cases, where things get tricky, in some instances precisely 
because of the decisions in these cases.  Allow me to illustrate 
what I mean by a difficult case.  I did not bring a road sign81 with 
me, because I thought it would be too heavy and because I think 
that is an easy case.  Here is my visual aid.  It is a handbag.  I think 
it is a nice handbag.  By the way, it is not made by a client, so I can 
say anything I want to about it.  I am a consumer for these 
purposes. 
This bag has a square bottom.  Its sides, when the bag is flat, are 
trapezoid.  It is fairly different from other handbags.  I could quite 
easily argue that this particular shape in this type of fabric is 
 
 81 See TrafFix Devices, 121 S. Ct. at 1258 (2001) (involving road signs that were 
connected to their base legs by two springs in order to remain upright despite adverse 
wind conditions). 
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distinctive for a handbag and should be protectable trade dress.  I 
don’t know whether people recognize it or not, though I would be 
curious to know.  In any event, this is an illustration of what I think 
is a difficult trade dress case, both on a policy level and in terms of 
applying what we can decipher to be the current law.  First, let me 
state explicitly the policy considerations I have in mind. 
The ultimate difficult policy issue is this: Should this design be 
protected under trademark law?  Or, if it should be protected from 
copying at all, should it be under a design patent, or possibly a 
modified form of design patent protection, such as some sort of a 
sui generis protection?  At this point, we have neither a coherent 
theory that could point to an answer, nor an explicit value 
judgment by Congress. 
I also want to point out two theoretical difficulties with product 
configuration trade dress protection that have a very real effect in 
this area. 
First, trademark law is designed to protect reasonable consumer 
expectations, in terms of whether something is a source identifier 
or not.82  But there is a real circularity problem, so that if the law 
protects something, the consumers can reasonably come to expect 
that to be a source identifier.  If, on the other hand, let’s take the 
Wal-Mart v. Samara Brothers decision as an example, if anyone 
can copy it – the children’s clothing design or the shape of this 
handbag – then it is not going to be reasonable for consumers to 
expect that look to be a source identifier. 
The second problem inherent in the decision of whether a  
product configuration should be protected as trade dress, is that if 
we have a new design that is different, one that is original and 
probably attractive, that design defines its own category of goods.  
Again, I am going to use my handbag to illustrate.  A lot of the 
trade dress/trademark over-protection concerns revolve around 
inhibiting competition.  The functionality doctrine is supposed to 
alleviate these concerns.  And, as I am going to get into the 
different tests for functionality, one is this: Are there enough 
available alternative designs so that protecting this handbag design 
 
 82 See generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 5:2 (discussing the development of 
trademark in Anglo-American common law).  
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under trademark law will not have an anticompetitive effect?83 
Well, here is the question: What is the relevant product or the 
relevant product category?  Is it handbags generally, in which case 
there are a lot of alternative designs available; or is it this particular 
type of handbag that someone came up with and consumers have 
come to like.  Is that a separate category? 
I believe that these problems – the circularity of consumer 
expectations and definition of relevant product categories – are in 
the background of every product design trade dress analysis.  
These are my overarching themes. 
Now, on functionality specifically, or really the requirement that 
trade dress be non-functional in order to merit protection under 
trademark law, that requirement is critically important, and it is 
meant to address two theoretical concerns.  Both of these concerns 
have to do with competition. 
One concern is that by over-extending trademark protection we 
may foreclose competition.  That is, in a way, just a general policy 
concern: Competition in the marketplace is good and we want to 
be very careful about foreclosing it.  The reason we do allow, and 
the courts have allowed, trade dress protection is because that 
protection also encourages competition, and fair competition at 
that,84 where the roots of trademark law lie in preventing free 
riding on somebody else’s goodwill85 and protecting consumer 
expectations in terms of who the producer of the good is.86  The 
doctrine of functionality is important in addressing this concern 
because it assures, at least in theory, that the types of features or 
designs that are necessary for effective competition – in other 
words functional features – are not protected under trademark law, 
meaning that no single producer can monopolize them. 
The second reason functionality has been considered extremely 
important is because it can define the boundaries between 
trademark protection and patent law protection.87  It all comes back 
 
 83 See generally Inna Fayenson, How Will High Court Rule?: Trade Dress Inherent 
Distinctiveness Is at Issue, N.Y. L.J. Jan. 8, 2000 at S4. 
 84 See supra note 83. 
 85 See id. 
 86 See id. 
 87 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1984); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-
1127 (1997 and 1999 Supplement).  Also referred to as the Trademark Act of 1946. 
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to the guiding principle that competition is very important and 
competition is what we want to encourage.  But the Constitution, 
by virtue of the Intellectual Property Clause, specifically enabled 
Congress to enact the patent and the copyright statutes88 because 
there were good reasons to do that.  We wanted to encourage 
innovation or creativity and were willing to foreclose competition 
in order to encourage those other good things, but only for a 
limited time.  In fact, the “limited time” is a Constitutional 
requirement that comes from the Intellectual Property Clause itself 
which gave Congress the authority “to promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”89 
The Constitutional dimension of the problem with protecting 
something under trademark law is the lack of a time limit.90  
Trademark protection may continue for so long as the trademark is 
in use.91  Hence, the potential conflict between the patent law 
regime, under which protection is available only for a limited time, 
as mandated by the Patent Clause, and potentially perpetual 
trademark protection. 
Those arguments were certainly presented to the Supreme Court 
in TrafFix92 because not only was there a theoretical possibility of 
trademark protection without end, but also because the case 
actually involved an expired utility patent.93   
TrafFix is a decision about functionality.  We know that because 
of the general competition concern and the Constitutional fear of 
trademark protection treading on patent ground, functionality or, 
conversely, the non-functionality requirement, is extremely 
important in the area of trade dress law.94  The question is: After 
 
 88 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
 89 See id. 
 90 See generally Perry J. Saidman, Kan TrafFix Kops Katch the Karavan Kopy Kats? 
or Beyond Functionality: Design Patents are the Key to Unlocking the Trade 
Dress/Patent Conundrum, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y. 839, 842-43 (2000) 
(discussing the ramifications of trademark law’s lack of time limit in the trade dress 
context). 
 91 Id. 
 92 See TrafFix, 121 S. Ct. at 1263. 
 93 See id. at 1258. 
 94 See Inna Fayenson, ‘TrafFix’ Clarifies Some Issues, Raises Others, N.Y. L.J. Apr. 
19, 2001 at 1. 
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TrafFix, do we have the answer to the question of how to figure 
out whether something is functional for trade dress purposes?  My 
answer is that after TrafFix we know sometimes, sort of, in some 
cases. 
TrafFix was, I think, a very easy case to decide on functionality 
grounds.  It involved, as Professor Hansen said, the design of 
temporary roadside sign stands.  A design involving two springs.  
A design that was at one point patented.  As was recited in the 
patent application, and in the course of patent prosecution, that 
design worked very well because it permitted the signs to 
withstand gusts of wind.95 
So what happened after the patent expired?  A competitor copied 
the design and the holder of the now-expired patent, Marketing 
Displays, sued alleging trade dress infringement.  Now, in 
describing the trade dress that Marketing Displays alleged should 
be protected, they talk not only about the two springs, but there 
really wasn’t much more to the trade dress.  The Supreme Court 
goes through the alleged trade dress and, in essence, says, “Well, 
what else is there?  There are legs, there is a stand, there is a place 
to put the sign.  I mean, what kind of trade dress is that?” 
The issue that was specifically before the Supreme Court in 
TrafFix was: What effect should an expired utility patent have on 
the issue of functionality and protectability of that same design 
under trade dress law?96 
Certainly, TrafFix, the defendant below, and some of the amicus 
briefs, argued that if you previously had a patent, once the patent 
expires, that previously protected invention/innovation is in the 
public domain, that that is an essential part of the “patent 
bargain.”97  In fact, this is something that the Supreme Court held 
quite a while ago, in 1938, in the Kellogg case.98 That case 
involved Shredded Wheat, the cereal, not the previously patented 
machinery that was used to make it, that wasn’t in issue, but the 
pillow shape of the cereal.99  In Kellogg, the Supreme Court came 
out and said very clearly: After expiration of a patent, it is in the 
 
 95 See TrafFix, 121 S. Ct. at 1258. 
 96 See id. 
 97 See TrafFix, 121 S. Ct. at 1263. 
 98 See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938). 
 99 See Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 111 (1938). 
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public domain, the public has a right to copy it.100 
Sixty-three years later, the Supreme Court in TrafFix did not say 
that.101  What they did say is that the utility patent is of great 
importance in determining whether a feature that has been 
proposed for trade dress protection is functional.102  In other words, 
existence of an expired utility patent is not dispositive of the issue 
but it “adds great weight to the presumption” of functionality.103 
Basically, I think the practical rule, this is my paraphrasing of it, 
from the TrafFix decision is: Anything you say in the course of 
applying, procuring, or enforcing a utility patent can and will be 
used against you to demonstrate functionality in trade dress. 
The other part of the TrafFix decision, however, the part that I 
think is more interesting, and is of much more general 
applicability, is deciphering what the test for functionality should 
be.  Forget about whether there was ever a patent or not. 
In a way, it starts with a footnote, as a lot of good stuff in 
Supreme Court opinions used to.  There was a Supreme Court 
decision, Inwood Laboratories,104 that had nothing to do with 
functionality, that was not in issue at all, but in a footnote the 
Court articulated what became the test for functionality in trade 
dress cases, by saying that a product feature is functional if it is 
essential to the use or purpose of the article, or if it affects the cost 
or quality of the article.105 
 
 
 100 “ It is self evident that on the expiration of the patent the monopoly granted by it 
ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered by the patent becomes 
public property.  It is upon this condition that the patent is granted.”  Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 
120 quoting Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896). 
 101 The Kellogg case was decided before the enactment of the Lanham Act and is, 
therefore, not controlling precedent. 
 102 “Where the expired patent claimed the features in question, one who seeks to 
establish trade dress protection must carry the heavy burden of showing that the feature is 
not functional, for instance by showing that it is merely ornamental, incidental, or 
arbitrary aspect of the device.”  See TrafFix, 121 S. Ct. at 1261. 
 103 See id. 
 104 456 U.S. 844 (1982) (At trial, the district court found that the color of prescription 
medication pills is functional because people, at times, rely on color to identify different 
types of medicine.). 
 105 See Inwood, 456 U.S. at 850, n.10 (1982) (“In general terms, a product feature is 
functional if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or 
quality of the article.” (citations omitted)). 
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About thirteen years later, in the Qualitex case,106 which 
considered whether color could serve as a trademark, the Court 
repeated the Inwood Laboratories test to talk about functionality, 
but then what they added – I think by way of explanation or 
elaboration – was a feature is functional “if the exclusive use of the 
feature would put competitors at a significant non-reputation-
related disadvantage.”107  Since then, and taking off from that 
language, the courts would consider whether there are alternative 
designs available for purposes of determining trade dress 
functionality.  That is what the Sixth Circuit in TrafFix did.  It took 
this portion of the functionality test so far as to say that hindering 
competition “somewhat” is not enough, that the competitors’ non-
reputation related disadvantage must be significant108 and 
concluded that the dual spring design is not necessarily functional 
because there are possible alternatives.  The net result of this 
reasoning was that the Sixth Circuit allowed Marketing Displays’ 
roadside stand design to be protected as trade dress. 
The Supreme Court, obviously, thought that was wrong, but it 
had to somehow address the possible alternative design analysis.  
So what the Supreme Court in TrafFix did was to say : “Well, no, 
it’s very clear what the test for functionality should be in a case 
like this,” and it is not the test applied by the Sixth Circuit.109  
First, according to the Supreme Court in TrafFix, we have the kind 
of utilitarian functionality test, which is the original Inwood 
Laboratories110 test, from a case that had nothing to do with 
functionality; and that is, whether the feature is essential to the use 
or purpose of the article or affects its cost or quality.111  That is the 
basic functionality test. I will call it the first filter.  It is only if 
something gets through the first filter – meaning that the feature is 
not functional under this test – that, according to TrafFix, you go 
 
 106 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995). 
 107 Id. at 165. 
 108 See Marketing Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929, 940 (6th Cir. 
1999). 
 109 532 U.S. at 1261. 
In finding for MDI on the trade dress issue the Court of Appeals gave 
insufficient recognition to the importance of the expired utility 
patents, and their evidentiary significance, in establishing the 
functionality of the device.  The error likely was caused by its 
misinterpretation of trade dress principles in other respects. 
Id.  
 110 Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982). 
 111 See TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 1261. 
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on to the second test, which examines the competitive advantage or 
disadvantage.112 
One of the more confusing things the Supreme Court said in 
TrafFix, however, is that the second test – the competitive 
necessity test – only applies in cases of aesthetic functionality,113 
which is a doctrine that has floated around, has always been 
problematic, and was put to rest, or so we thought.114  The Court 
did not look at it for a while, even though I think in the Wal-Mart 
v. Samara case there were some indications that the Court at least 
thought about it.115  It seems to me that if the Court had been 
serious about re-establishing aesthetic functionality as a trade dress 
concept, Wal-Mart was a much more appropriate case for doing 
that. 
Instead, the Supreme Court in TrafFix, in a case that involved 
road signs and a dual-spring design, revived, or so it seems, what is 
known as the aesthetic functionality doctrine.116  The reason they 
did so, I think, is because they were trying to somehow distinguish 
or reconcile a prior case, Qualitex, without really considering the 
implications. 
So the bottom line after TrafFix is this: We know that a dual-
spring design that enables a roadside sign to withstand gusts of 
wind, and that was previously protected by a utility patent, is 
functional and, therefore, is not protectable as trade dress.  But do 
we know how, under what circumstances, would a design like my 
bag be protected?  Is this design aesthetically functional?  I do not 
know.  We can examine whether alternative designs are available, 
which is the test for aesthetic functionality, not just whether it is 
pleasing.  But then we come back to one of the problems I 
 
 112 See id. at 1262 (“Where the design is functional under the Inwood formulation 
there is no need to proceed further to consider if there is a competitive necessity for the 
future.”). 
 113 See id. 
 114 In general, the theory behind the aesthetic functionality doctrine is that designs that 
do not have a utilitarian function may, nevertheless, be functional for trademark law 
purposes, and hence not protectable, because their “function” is to be aesthetically 
pleasing.  See, e.g., Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952); see 
generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, §§ 7:79-7.:83 (4th ed. 1996). 
 115 529 U.S. at 213 (“Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of competition 
with regard to the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product design ordinarily serves 
by a rule of law that facilitates plausible threats of suit against new entrants based upon 
alleged inherent distinctiveness.”). 
 116 See Fayenson, supra note 94. 
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mentioned in the beginning: Whether alternative designs are 
available depends on how you define the product, the relevant 
product category. 
Ultimately, my point is that we have had a couple of Supreme 
Court decisions that seem to be very clear on where they are 
coming out.117  In Wal-Mart we have a bright-line rule: You must 
have secondary meaning.118  In TrafFix, here is the test for 
utilitarian functionality,119 here is the test for aesthetic 
functionality.120 
At the end of the day, though, we have not gained a whole lot of 
predictability, at least in the difficult cases.  The only way I think 
we can attain predictability is if there is a policy decision that is 
made on whether something like this bag should be protected or 
not. 
Thank you. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Thank you, Inna. 
Our next speaker is Perry J. Saidman of the Saidman DesignLaw 
Group in Washington, D.C., who will address what the Court 
avoided in TrafFix, the patent spin. 
MR. SAIDMAN: It is a pleasure to be here.  I am honored to be 
on this panel.  I am particularly honored that I am the only patent 
lawyer on the panel, but please don’t hold that against me.  I was 
brought in to give you the patent spin on what happened in TrafFix 
and what the Court is doing with trade dress. 
I have brought slides to keep you awake.  You know, it is much 
easier to give a forty-five minute talk than figure out what you 
need to say in only fifteen or twenty minutes.  So, in view of the 
limited time, I think I am going to just dispense with the family 
slides and cut to the chase. 
[Slide]  When you are talking about designs, I think you’ve got 
to see the designs.  Here is the famous tertium quid of the Two 
 
 117  See id. 
 118 See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 216 (“We hold that, in an action for infringement of 
unregistered trade dress under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a product’s design is 
distinctive, and therefore protectible, only upon a showing of secondary meaning.”). 
 119 See TrafFix, 121 S. Ct. at 1261-62. 
 120 See id. 
TM PANEL.PP8 9/6/01  11:21 PM 
2001] NYSBA TRADEMARK PANEL 535 
 
Pesos case.  The “good guy’s” restaurant is on the left and the “bad 
guy’s” is on the right. 
[Slide]  Here are some of the designs involved in the Wal-Mart 
case.  Again, the “good guy’s” clothing is on the left, the “bad 
guy’s” is on the right.  Here is the flower dress, and here is the 
famous strawberry dress. 
[Slide]  In TrafFix, we have the plaintiff’s, “good guy’s,” the 
original sign on the left, and the virtually identical defendant’s 
design on the right, both having the closely-spaced springs at the 
bottom.  You have seen these.  There are probably twenty right out 
here on 62nd Street. 
[Slide]  On the next slide you’ve got the plaintiff’s design on the 
left and the expired utility patent on the right that has the springs 
spaced further apart than the actual commercial model on the 
left.121 
Now, the most fascinating issue in TrafFix was the one that the 
Supreme Court completely dodged. 
[Slide]  The U.S. Constitution says that: “Congress has the 
power to promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts by 
securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive 
right to their respective writings and discoveries.”122  This is the 
basis for patent law. 
The limited time right now, as most of you know, is twenty 
years for a utility patent123 and fourteen years for a design 
patent.124  When a patent expires, the subject matter falls into the 
public domain, free to be made, used, or sold by anyone.  As was 
pointed out by the previous speakers, trade dress rights can last 
forever, as long as the owner is using the mark. 
So the killer question, the one the Supreme Court dodged, is: “Is 
it constitutional to grant exclusive trade dress rights for an 
unlimited duration under the federal Lanham Act, the Trademark 
Act,125 for a design that is the subject of an expired patent?” 
 
 121 See Saidman, supra note 90 (containing pictures of the signs at issue). 
 122 U.S. CONST. art. I § 8. 
 123 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1984). 
 124 Id. § 173 (1984). 
 125 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129 (1997 and 1999 Supplement).  Also referred to as the 
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My answer to that question is, “No,” despite the fact that no 
court has ever so held.  And I believe that the answer to that 
question is completely independent of the functionality doctrine, 
and has more to do with the bargain made between the designer 
and the public.  The bargain is this: “We’ll give you your patent, 
you can have a monopoly for fourteen or twenty years, but when it 
is over, it’s over.  The public will then be able to make free use of 
your product design.” 
I think few of us on the panel would argue with the tremendous 
expansion of rights resulting from Court enforcement of Section of 
43(a)126 over the past thirty years to include, as has been pointed 
out, not only packaging of products, but also product 
configuration, or what the Court has come to call “product design.” 
Now, in my view, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Wal-Mart127 
and TrafFix128 are in reaction to the overreaching of creative 
lawyers using “good guy/bad guy” emotional appeals to courts for 
their desperate clients whose products have been copied at a time 
when copyright and patent protection are not available, either 
because the product is not copyrightable, it is too late to apply for a 
patent, or, as in the TrafFix case, the patent has expired.  This 
happens a lot, as we will see. 
Most courts, even here in the Southern District of New York, 
give in to this emotional appeal.129  The reason they do that is 
because no one is arguing on behalf of the public interest, the 
public’s right to copy product designs whose patents have expired.  
The fees of skilled and creative lawyers are paid by protectionists 
who want to be able to monopolize their product design as long as 
possible.  I am one of those lawyers. 
Besides, it is unpopular to argue that someone who has copied 
another’s design has a perfect right to do so.  It is like the ACLU 
defending the Nazis’ right to march in Skokie. 
So the lower courts, in enforcing Section 43(a) rights very, very 
broadly, have ignored some old right-to-copy precedent by the 
 
Trademark Act of 1946. 
 126 Lanham Act § 43(a) codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1997 and 1999 
Supplement). 
 127 See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 205. 
 128 See TrafFix, 121 S. Ct. at 1255. 
 129 See Saidman, supra note 90. 
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Supreme Court.  In Wal-Mart and TrafFix, what I see is the Court 
reacting by greatly narrowing, if not killing, Section 43(a) rights 
and, as Professor Hansen pointed out, giving a warning in the last 
paragraph of the TrafFix opinion, that it is going to revisit the 
constitutional issue if the lower courts do not restrict trade dress 
rights.130 
In this very brief time I am going to review a handful of the 
cases in this area, I’m going to talk a little bit about increasingly 
important design patents, and conclude with my prediction on 
where the courts might be headed. 
[Slide]  The most significant right-to-copy case is the 1938 
decision of Kellogg v. National Biscuit.131  In the Kellogg case 
Nabisco had utility patents on the famous Shredded Wheat biscuit 
and the machines for making it.132  Nabisco also had a design 
patent on the shape of the biscuit.133  Now, all of these patents had 
expired by the time Nabisco sued to enjoin Kellogg’s sale of 
pillow-shaped biscuits of Shredded Wheat. 
Let’s see what Justice Brandeis had to say:  
A design patent was taken out to cover the pillow-
shaped form.  Hence, upon expiration of the patents, 
the form as well as the name was dedicated to the 
public.  Kellogg Company is undoubtedly sharing in 
the goodwill of the article known as ‘Shredded 
Wheat;’ and thus is sharing in a market which was 
created by the skill and judgment of [Nabisco] and 
has been widely extended by vast expenditures in 
advertising.  But that is not unfair.  Sharing in the 
goodwill of an article unprotected by patent is the 
exercise of a right possessed by all, and in the free 
exercise of which the consuming public is deeply 
interested.134 
Now, this case was decided long before the Federal Lanham Act 
was passed, so it is not directly on point, but it does set out what I 
feel are the controlling principles. 
 
 130 See TrafFix, 121 S. Ct. at 1263. 
 131 See Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 111. 
 132 See e.g., U.S. Patent No. 548,086 (issued Oct. 15, 1895). 
 133 See U.S. Design Patent No. 24,688 (issued Sept. 17, 1895). 
 134 Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 122. 
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There are a lot of cases exactly like this from that era and before 
and afterwards.  How have the lower courts dealt with this issue? 
[Slide]  A typical case is Krueger International v. Nightingale, 
Inc. 135 from the Southern District of New York.  The plaintiff had 
obtained a design patent in 1978,136 shown on the left, covering the 
very same chair design rights it was now asserting against 
Nightingale under Section 43(a). 
[Slide]  The defendant’s chair is shown on the left in this slide 
next to the plaintiff’s expired design patent.  Judge Sotomayor did 
not see a problem in a design owner asserting trade dress rights in 
a product that was the subject of an expired design patent.137 
[Slide]  The Topps v. Verburg case138 did the same thing.  After 
the plaintiff’s design patent139 on its diamond ring lollipop, shown 
at the top, expired, they got a trademark registration140 on the same 
design, shown at the bottom, which the judge had no trouble 
enforcing against a competitor.141 
Now, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) 
routinely issues trademark registrations covering product designs 
that are the subject of expired patents.142 
[Slide]  Perhaps the most famous is where Honeywell obtained a 
trademark registration143 on its round thermostat – the registration 
is on the bottom – which was the subject matter of its expired 
design patent, shown at the top.144 
[Slide]  Here is a trademark registration that covers the 
configuration of the world’s best-selling desk lamp, known as the 
Tizio.145  This lamp was the subject of a utility patent, invented in 
 
 135 915 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 136 U.S. Design Patent No. 246,813 (issued Jan. 3, 1978). 
 137 See Krueger, 915 F. Supp. at 605. 
 138 Topps Co. v. Gerrit J. Verburg Co., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18556, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1412 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 1996). 
 139 U.S. Patent No. Des.242,646 (issued Dec. 7, 1976). 
 140 U.S. Trademark Reg. No.1,846,873 (registered July 26, 1994). 
 141 See Topps Co. v. Gerrit J. V, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18556 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 
1996). 
 142 See Saidman, supra note 90 at 847. 
 143 U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 1,622.108 (registered Nov. 13, 1990). 
 144 In re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344; U.S. Patent No. Des.176,657 ( issued Jan. 
17, 1956). 
 145 U.S. Trademark Reg. No. 1,442,994 (registered June 16, 1987). 
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1971 by Richard Sapper,146 a well-known designer, and shortly 
after that, he licensed it to Artemide who produced the Tizio.  The 
claim in this utility patent covers the structure of this lamp.  This 
patent expired two weeks after the trademark registration issued. 
This registration should never have been issued, due to the right-
to-copy doctrine.147  The right to copy without unduly restrictive 
monopolies fosters competition, and, hence, low prices for 
consumers, which is good.  As you can see, the public’s right to 
copy has been virtually ignored by the PTO and in many trade 
dress infringement cases, including at least half-a-dozen 1980s 
cases in which the configuration of this lamp was successfully 
litigated.148 
[Slide]  You will forgive me, I think, but in view of what the 
Supreme Court is doing to Section 43(a) for product designs, 
which is demolishing it, I feel obligated to share with you, with 
trademark lawyers, my list of the Top Ten Reasons for Getting 
Design Patents. 
Reason Number Ten: There is never a need to prove secondary 
meaning to get a design patent.  It doesn’t matter how many you 
sold.  So design patents are ideal for brand new products. 
Reason Number Nine: Functionality is almost never a problem 
with design patents.  In the thousands of applications I have 
handled, I have never even had the patent examiner raise 
functionality as an issue. 
Reason Number Eight: The standard of obviousness is rarely a 
problem with respect to newly designed products.  I would say we 
get an obviousness rejection in only one out of ten design patent 
applications, and these are usually pretty easy to overcome. 
Reason Number Seven: It is possible to get design patents very, 
very quickly.  They have a new “rocket docket” system at the 
Patent Office that allows design patents to sail through. 
 
 
 146 U.S. Patent No. 3,790,773 (issued Feb. 5, 1974). 
 147 See Saidman, supra note 90 at 846. 
 148 See, e.g., PAF S.r.l. v. Lisa Lighting Co., 712 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); 
Artemide SpA v. Grandrich Corp., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16742 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 
1987); Artemide SpA v. Grandlite Design & Mfg. Co., 672 F. Supp. 698 (S.D.N.Y. 
1987). 
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[Slide]  Here is one that we were able to get in five months from 
the time of filing. 
[Slide]  And we got better and better.  Here is one we got in 
about four months. 
[Slide]  Three and a half months. 
[Slide]  And the pièce de resistance, this one issued within two 
months of its filing date.  It is possible to get them quickly if you 
need them. 
Reason Number Six: Design patents are good for fourteen years 
from the day they issue.149  They do not require the payment of 
maintenance fees,150 as utility patents do, or the filing of 
continued-use affidavits, as trademarks do.151 
Reason Number Five: You have a great chance of obtaining a 
preliminary injunction (“PI”) in a design patent case.  In a five-
year period recently, 70 percent of the PI motions were granted.152  
The judges can see with their own eyes that the design has been 
infringed. 
Reason Number Four: The Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit has exclusive nationwide jurisdiction over all patent 
cases.153  This is in contrast to trademark law, where, as you know, 
the various circuits are about to do battle for the next ten years 
over the doctrine of functionality and what it means, thanks to 
TrafFix.  The Federal Circuit’s rulings on issues like willful 
infringement,154 which can get you triple damages and attorneys’ 
fees,155 have greatly benefited design patent owners. 
Reason Number Three: Design patents are very flexible.  It is 
very easy to protect individual components of a design as well as 
the overall product.  I’ve got some examples here. 
 
 149 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1984). 
 150 35 U.S.C. § 41(b)  (1999). 
 151 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1997 and 1999 Supplement).  Also referred to as the 
Trademark Act of 1946. 
 152 See Perry J. Saidman, Design Patents - the Whipping Boy Bites Back, 73 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 859, 866 (1991). 
 153 35 U.S.C. § 141(1984). 
 154 Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380  (Fed. Cir. 
1987). 
 155 35 U.S.C. §§ 284-287 (1984). 
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[Slide]  Here is the design patent by Bruce Burdick covering a 
new flatware design which consists of metal flatware and a plastic 
piece that is on the rear part of the flatware.156  We were able to get 
a design patent not only on the combination but on the plastic 
handle by itself,157 the metal knife,158 the metal fork,159 the metal 
spoon,160 and the bumps that were on the plastic handles161 in 
combination, with the support knob that is below the flatware.162  
And again, we were able to get a design patent on just that feature 
of the support knob that rests below the flatware. 
[Slide]  Now the fashion industry is beginning to use design 
patents.  Here are a couple of design patents that issued just this 
year to Levi-Straus on jean designs.163 
[Slide]  And design patents are even being used to protect 
packaging.  Here is a design patent on the Aquafresh toothpaste 
box, which includes a hologram feature about the periphery.164 
The Number Two reason for getting design patents is that the 
test for infringement is quite broad.  It goes back 130 years to a 
great case for design patent owners, Gorham v. White.165 
[Slide]  If you look at these drawings, all you have to know is 
that the Supreme Court found both of the White designs,166 on the 
left and on the right, to be infringements of the Gorham patent167 in 
the middle.  So, despite what you may have heard, design patents 
do have scope and the infringing design does not need to be 
identical to the patented design for infringement to be proved. 
So what’s the Number One reason for getting design patents?  It 
is this: What choice has the Supreme Court given you? 
 
 
 156 U.S. Design Patent No. 346,722 (issued May 10, 1994). 
 157  U.S. Design Patent No. 345,486 (issued Mar. 29, 1994). 
 158  U.S. Design Patent No. 345,284 (issued Mar. 22, 1994). 
 159  U.S. Design Patent No. 358,741 (issued May 30, 1995). 
 160  U.S. Design Patent No. 351,091 (issued Oct. 4, 1994). 
 161  U.S. Design Patent No. 355,565 (issued Feb. 21, 1995). 
 162  U.S. Design Patent No. 351,310 (issued Oct. 11, 1994). 
 163 U.S. Design Patent Nos. 436,714 (issued Jan. 30, 2001); 437,102 (issued Feb. 6, 
2001). 
 164 U.S. Design Patent No. 420,910 (issued Feb. 22, 2000). 
 165 81 U.S. 511 (1871). 
 166 U.S. Design Patent Nos. 2,551 (Jan. 15, 1867); 2,992 (Mar. 31, 1868). 
 167 U.S. Design Patent No. 1,440 (Jul. 16, 1861). 
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Although a design patent will cost you $2,000 or $3,000, it is a 
bargain compared to the cost of going to court with your 
unregistered trade dress, trying to prove it has secondary meaning 
and that the design is not essential to the use or purpose of the 
article, does not affect the cost or quality of the article, and will not 
put competitors at a disadvantage if they are denied use of it.  What 
is that going to cost? 
So, suing under Section 43(a) is now, I think, somewhat of a 
crap shoot, and you may as well tell your client to head for Atlantic 
City. 
Where will the Supreme Court and the lower courts go, now that 
the pendulum is decidedly swinging away from Section 43(a) 
protection for product design?  I think, just like after Two Pesos, 
where the lower courts struggled for years to find a test for 
inherent distinctiveness, they are now going to struggle to apply 
the Inwood and Qualitex definitions of functionality.  The 
definition of functionality from Inwood will be used as the 
standard for testing for utilitarian functionality, and the definition 
from Qualitex will be used as the test for aesthetic functionality, 
which rises like a phoenix from the ashes. 
The existence of alternate designs, the Court said in TrafFix, will 
only be relevant in cases of aesthetic functionality.168  And, while 
the Inwood test will be used with product designs protected by 
utility patents, the Qualitex test, I predict, will be used with 
product designs protected by design patents whose subject matter 
is, by definition, aesthetic or ornamental.  We had a hint of this in 
the Wal-Mart case, where the Court spoke about unusual product 
designs making the product more appealing.169 
Now, is there any precedent, you might ask, for using aesthetic 
functionality to test whether a product design protected by a design 
patent may also have §43(a) trade dress protection?  The only case 
I have found was right here in the Second Circuit, a 1984 decision 
from the Court of Appeals called Saporiti v. Craig.170  It was a 
 
 168 See TrafFix, 121 S. Ct. at, 1261. 
 169 See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 213 (“Consumers are aware of the reality that, almost 
invariably, even the most unusual product designs – such as a cocktail shaker shaped like 
a penguin – is intended not to identify the source, but to render the product itself more 
useful or more appealing.”). 
 170 See Industria Arredamenti Fratelli Saporiti v. Charles Craig, 725 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 
1984). 
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Section 43(a) action based on a sofa design that was the subject of 
an expired design patent.171 
Judge Clement Haynsworth, who was at one time nominated to 
sit on the Supreme Court, gave a definition of functionality that 
was a precursor to the Inwood definition: “A feature is clearly 
functional if it is an important ingredient in the commercial success 
of the product.”172  Haynsworth was very clear that functional was 
not the same as utilitarian and not the opposite of ornamental.  In 
fact, he found the sofa design functional because it was “attractive 
to buyers.”173 
This is classic aesthetic functionality, and here it comes again.  If 
you are confused about this, just imagine how the federal judges 
are going to deal with this.  One might well ask: “If this becomes 
the test, what kind of product design will be protectable under 
Section 43(a)?” 
[Slide]  So what is the bottom line?  The party is over for 
Section 43(a) trade dress protection for product design. 
I have three pieces of advice: Number one, get design patents.  
Number two, get design patents. And number three of course 
speaks for itself [get design patents]. 
Thank you. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Thank you very much, Perry.  That 
was very interesting. 
Now we want to open up the discussion to members of our 
audience either for comments or questions.  Any questions, 
thoughts? 
PARTICIPANT: I have a question for Mr. Saidman.  Other than 
case law, do you feel that there is a policy justification for why the 
patent statute’s limit on protection of design should trump those of 
the Lanham Act174and associated trademark statutes? 
 
 
 171 See id. 
 172 See id. at 19. 
 173 See id. at 20. 
 174 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129 (1997 and 1999 Supplement).  Also referred to as the 
Trademark Act of 1946. 
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MR. SAIDMAN: Well, one could argue that the Lanham Act is 
based on the Commerce Clause175 and it is trumped by Article 1, 
Clause 8, Section 8 of the Constitution,176 which is the 
constitutional basis for passing the patent and the copyright acts.  
So you could argue that. 
But really, the policy justification can be as simple as: it is more 
important to promote the progress of science and the useful arts 
than it is to prevent a little consumer confusion.  This has to do 
with the fact that §43(a) is not a design protection law, it is a 
consumer protection law.  This was articulated best, I think, by the 
10th Circuit in the Vornado v. Duracraft177 case.  For other 
excellent discussions of the policy issues, see the dissents in 
Ferrari v. Roberts178 from the 6th Circuit, and Kohler v. Moen179 
from the 7th Circuit. 
Also remember that the Supreme Court stands as the last barrier 
against overuse of §43(a), because the Court likes competition, and 
exclusive rights like trade dress are anticompetitive.  The Court 
wants people to be able to freely copy products that are in the 
public domain – that, I think, is the undercurrent of what is going 
on. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Any comments on that from other 
panelists?   
Just on the Constitutional issue, I do not think it is clear, and I do 
not think the Court wants to reach that issue, because then you 
would have all sorts of implications for other laws, and they do not 
usually want to bind the hand of Congress on what it can do.  It is 
very, very difficult for the Court to say there is no power in the 
government to do something that the government wants to do. 
It is one thing to say that the federal government has power and 
the states, therefore, do not.  However, it is another thing entirely 
to say that nobody has it.  Most justices, even if they think the 
policy is wrong, do not want to handcuff the government in that 
way.  So, I think they would be reluctant to do it, and that is 
probably why they reserved the decision, and they may not have 
 
 175 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 176 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 177 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 178 Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1248 (6th Cir. 1991). 
 179 Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc. 12 F.3d 632, 644 (7th Cir. 1993). 
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the votes for it in any case. 
But, to some degree, what is interesting is the practicality of 
another one of these cases reaching the Supreme Court, because 
how many people can afford litigation to get to the Supreme 
Court?  The normal defendants in these cases cannot.  Wal-Mart is 
not a normal defendant, and it can finance these things. 
But I just ask the practitioners here, in your experience, certainly 
in copyright cases, your normal cases, you have a preliminary 
injunction and an appeal, and that’s it.  You never even get to a 
trial unless you combine the trial with the preliminary injunction 
hearing, right?  What is your feeling about this type of litigation?  
Even if it does protect people, will they still be scared away from 
the thought of the litigation, and so the practical effect will be less 
than the theoretical effect? 
MR. MITCHELL: I think that remains to be seen.  Certainly the 
cases that get up to the Court are few and far between.  There is the 
occasional petition for certiorari.  There is some fear of the 
anticompetitive strike suits.  Nevertheless, the law is slow-moving 
and conservative, and I think that the Wal-Mart case, whether it is 
on the designer side or the copier side, is going to help the big guy, 
because the small guy is not going to have the money to try to 
enforce his rights and prove secondary meaning, and the big guy 
can, nevertheless, always put enough into litigation, keep it going 
long enough, to win a war of attrition. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Okay. 
Yes?  And please identify your affiliation, because we are 
publishing this, and we would like to give you proper credit. 
PARTICIPANT: Victor Servey [phonetic].  I’m a patent attorney 
practicing in New York. 
Do you ever see the day when Rule 11180 sanctions would be 
imposed for trying to enforce a trademark based on an expired 
patent or a design patent or whatever? 
MR. MITCHELL: There has been no per se rule, and I think if 
you’ve got enough skilled argument to come up with the reason, 
Rule 11 should not come into play.  When I was discussing this 
 
 180 Fed. R. Civ. Pro. R. 11. 
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case with a patent lawyer in my firm – he is writing an article from 
the patent side about TrafFix, I’m writing an article from the 
trademark side – his advice to patent lawyers was make sure you 
put in your patent application enough self-serving language that 
you can then argue that this is totally arbitrary. 
On the TrafFix case he argued – I disagree, but he argued – that 
if you said: “Well, the springs can be in any position, just as long 
as there are two of them,” then he could argue that he could protect 
his own design of springs so long as there are other ways of doing 
it. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I do not think there would be any Rule 
11181 sanctions, certainly not on the basis of the Supreme Court 
decision.  I don’t think so. 
MR. SERVEY: Basically, the way I see it, until the 
Constitutional question that Mr. Saidman brought up is answered, 
there is an incentive for using the threat of litigation to enforce 
your design rights into perpetuity. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: The reason that most people do not 
think there is a conflict between patent law and trademark law is 
they protect two different things.  Patent law protects things which 
are non-obvious, useful, and novel, and they are meant as 
incentives to research and development and whatever.  Trademark 
law is there to prevent consumer confusion, and also free riding on 
goodwill.  These types of protection are different and not mutually 
exclusive.  They can both be applied and there is nothing 
inherently wrong in saying a trademark should exist after a patent. 
The problem is: When the trademark itself has a specific, truly 
functional, utilitarian advantage that competitors are now going to 
be denied after the fact, how do you balance the two?  So, it is 
legitimate to say that one policy should prevail over the other.  It is 
much more difficult to say the Constitution defines that policy. 
I doubt very much that the Supreme Court is going to go that 
way, and I am not sure whether the Court will be presented with an 
opportunity to do so, considering the costs involved to litigants.  
But I guess we will see. 
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In the back? 
QUESTION: Marsha Ajhar with Abelman Frayne & Schwab 
here in New York. 
First of all, I was happy when Pagliero182 was dead, and I am 
not at all sure that aesthetic functionality is the way to go.  I didn’t 
get it the first time around, so it is going to be curious to see what 
happens to it next time. 
The second thought that I had was that harmonization seems to 
be a trend internationally.  We are desperately trying to get the EU 
and different treaties going.  A decision like TrafFix, and the 
aftermath. is going to cause heart attacks in Milan and other 
European cities where protecting design is critical. 
I wonder what sort of observations or predictions you might 
have about possible ramifications internationally, because it seems 
like we’re definitely the “Wild, Wild West” when it comes to 
protecting product designs. 
MS. FAYENSON: Well, I guess one possibility, as Perry 
Saidman said, may be that more people will start utilizing design 
patent protection.  I agree it is the more appropriate way to protect 
product design. 
Could we end up with a sui generis design protection statute, 
like a lot of European countries do?  I don’t know.  That is 
something that has been pending for how many years? 
MR. SAIDMAN: For seventy or eighty years there have been 
laws in front of Congress. 
MS. FAYENSON: Trying to get that enacted will be very 
difficult. 
MR. SAIDMAN: Right.  And this might well be the thing that 
forces Congress to take another look at that.  The last time this was 
brought up was maybe ten years ago, just before Clinton was 
elected,183 but the bill died because of a big lobby from the spare 
parts people and the insurance industry, who did not want a “cheap 
and dirty” design protection bill, which is the way they protect 
 
 182 Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952). 
 183 Design Innovation and Technology Act of 1991 (HR 1790);  See Cong. Rec. 
4/16/91, p. H2249, and 4/17/91, p. E1279 for introductory remarks. 
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designs in Europe it is like a copyright, and that does not exist here 
in the States. 
PARTICIPANT: Has there been any mention of taking the term 
for a design patent and extending it?  I mean, fourteen years184 
really does not seem very generous, compared to the twenty for 
utilitarian.185  Any sort of groundswell for extension? 
MS. FAYENSON: I would think that if there were a design 
protection statute, it would have a shorter life span.  I am not sure 
that we should be looking at expanding the time frame for it.  That 
is my thought.  If we are talking about anything like the fashion 
industry, fourteen years is forever.  Most designs become 
irrelevant after six months anyway. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: My suit might be fourteen years old 
actually. 
MS. FAYENSON: I’m sorry.  Well, some of them come back. 
MR. MITCHELL: They all come back, vinyl pants even. 
Also, I think that, as opposed to utility patents, with a design 
patent, one way you can also look at it is that you’ve got fourteen 
years, and a design patent is by definition a non-utilitarian item, so 
you are not dealing with a functionality issue.  So that gives you 
your time to do what you can to get secondary meaning and to 
build that up. 
MS. FAYENSON: Yes, but I actually think that is the really 
interesting question and the real problem.  Should you be able to 
use design patent protection for those fourteen years.  Let’s 
imagine something that is not going out of style – to build up 
secondary meaning, and then say: “Well, here we go.  Now I 
clearly have secondary meaning?” 
The funny thing that the Supreme Court did in the Wal-Mart186 
case is it almost seemed to go that way, because in addressing the 
concern about protecting innovators who may come up with 
something inherently distinctive, even though the Court says: “We 
don’t think that’s really possible.”  Let’s say they do; they can look 
to design patent or copyright for protection before they have 
 
 184 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1984). 
 185 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1984). 
 186 See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 205. 
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secondary meaning.  To me, that is just the Supreme Court getting 
it all mixed up. 
That is the case I would actually like to see before the Supreme 
Court, something protected by design patent, clearly not 
functional, it acquires secondary meaning in a very clear, tangible, 
demonstrable way.  Should it be protected under trade dress law? 
MR. SAIDMAN: As an aside, the term for design patents is 
about to be bumped up by one year to fifteen years as the result of 
the U.S. assent to the Hague Agreement for the protection of 
designs.187 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Looking at Perry’s presentation, as a 
non-patent lawyer, it seemed to me that design patents are granted 
too easily and that the infringement standard is close to ridiculous.  
If the Supreme Court ever got a look at your presentation, design 
patents would be next up on their hit list. 
MR. SAIDMAN: We haven’t had a design patent case in the 
Supreme Court for 130 years, so shhh. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I used to think they were hard to get 
and that it was good that they were hard to get.  If those are easy to 
get, it actually seems anticompetitive to me, because it just wasn’t 
readily apparent to me – the non-obviousness or novelty of those 
as standards.  Are they still standards? 
MR. SAIDMAN: Yes. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Pretty watered-down, though, aren’t 
they? 
MR. SAIDMAN: Well, you know, how do you know when 
something is non-obvious or inherently distinctive? 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: I know it when I see it. 
MS. FAYENSON: But might not the same thing happen as 
happened in the business methods patent area, where people just 
focused on it, and there was so much around that the PTO started 
enforcing the non-obviousness? 
 
 
 187 Hague Conference Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 65 Fed. Reg. 61306-02 (Oct. 17, 2000). 
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MR. SAIDMAN: You know, the pendulums swing in all the 
areas of the law.  When they get overused, something bites you and 
it swings back in the other direction. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: There was a hand over here? 
PARTICIPANT: Bruce Lederman [phonetic].  I am a solo 
practitioner.  I represent a number of small businesses that are 
always being accused of knocking off one thing or another.   
I am wondering if the panel has any thoughts on this case 
involving sports teams, which I had and settled a couple of years 
ago and have thought about since.  One case that came up is you 
have Michael Jordan playing in a red uniform that says “Chicago 
Bulls” and “Michael Jordan” on the back, and then somebody 
comes to you and says: “I have a good idea.  Let’s sell a red T-shirt 
that says ‘23.’  We’re not going to write ‘Chicago Bulls,’ we’re not 
going to write ‘Michael Jordan.’  But there are a ton of kids out 
there who would just like a bright-red basketball shirt that says 
‘23.’” 
I am wondering, listening to some of the discussion on the more 
recent Supreme Court cases, if the panel has any thoughts on that. 
MR. MITCHELL: One problem that you would have, the one 
place where Michael Jordan might get a chance to come up with an 
argument, would be on a right of publicity statute,188 to say that he 
is so identified with number twenty-three.  But he would have a 
problem with exclusivity because there are sports teams all over 
that have red uniforms that have twenty-three on them.  So that one 
is tougher. 
I did run into a case recently, though, where someone was 
selling T-shirts that replicated all the tattoos on Dennis Rodman’s 
body, and he managed to get those enjoined.  I don’t know how 
anybody managed to sell them, but he managed to get them 
enjoined nonetheless. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: That would be an easy case.  I think 
more people are aware of ‘23’ than of all the tattoos on Rodman’s 
body.  It seems that ‘23’ is an easy publicity case, and I think that 
would be enjoined in a second.  The point of publicity cases is that 
 
 188 See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 28:17, n. 1; Sudakshina Sen, Comment, Fluency 
of the Flesh: Perils of an Expanding Right of Publicity, 59 ALB. L. REV. 739 (1995). 
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you are using the good will someone generates with the public 
without payment or authorization.  The point is the use of the good 
will, and it does not matter if you use the number of a race car 
associated with a driver,189 a car associated with a T.V. show,190 or 
“Here’s Johnny.”  I would think a right of publicity, on these facts, 
would be fairly easy to litigate for the plaintiff.  Furthermore, 
Michael Jordan is someone who has the resources and access to 
counsel that would enhance the chance of an action being brought. 
MR. SAIDMAN: If you want to make red T-shirts with the 
number ‘23’ on them, I’ll be glad to represent you. 
PARTICIPANT: Evan Katz, IP Network. 
The discussion calls to mind the use of watching services191 for 
companies to make sure that dubious trademark registrations do 
not slip through, or perhaps even dubious design patents, to oppose 
or seek re-examination.  I am curious if the panelists have advised 
their clients to have industry-wide watches on both the patent and 
the trademark side to try to nip in the bud overly broad trademark 
registrations or design patents? 
I also wanted to know if the panel is aware of what is being done 
on the trademark side of the PTO concerning the following point: 
Namely, how in the world can non-engineering trademark 
engineers consider functionality issues in an ex parte trademark 
application setting without really pulling the patent people in, or 
perhaps punting it entirely over to an inter partes proceeding 
where the board might have a better shot? 
MS. FAYENSON: First of all, in terms of trademark watching 
services, I almost always advise clients to do that.  In trade dress 
registration, it is a little tougher because there are more judgment 
calls involved with just word trademarks as well, but that is 
something that we do routinely.  Certainly the clients who can 
think about it and can afford it do that. 
MR. MITCHELL: It is also tough.  I have been involved in a 
couple of oppositions to registration of trade dress features, where 
 
 189 See, e.g., Lothar Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, 498 F.2d 
821 (9th Cir. 1974).  
 190 See, e.g., Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F. 2d 327 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 191 See e.g., www.thomson-thomson.com, www.marksonline.com (last visited June 
26, 2001). 
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my client, the opposer, claimed that: “This is not distinctive” or 
“This is generic,” and you start out and your client is gung-ho for 
protecting everyone’s right to use the design.  Ultimately what 
happens is they get tired of paying your bills, the other side gets 
tired of fighting, and you, as often as not, wind up coming up with 
a settlement where the opposition is dropped for a royalty-free, 
basically a naked license.192 
MS. FAYENSON: That works sometimes. 
MR. SAIDMAN: It works for the client, anyway. 
MS. FAYENSON: But, in reality, it is possible, not always, to 
achieve both sides’ objectives, if they can really define where the 
confusion might come into play, if you’re going to be idealistic 
about it. 
MR. KATZ: I think the cases underscore the point.  Most of my 
clients when I was in private practice had watch services193 for 
their trademarks only, but, given the reasonable cost of having a 
watch service across the entire industry to try to flag some of these 
before they come out, it can be a lot cheaper than litigating them 
up through any court system. 
PARTICIPANT: My name is Stanley Garrett.  I am a general 
practitioner spending some of my time counseling clients who 
want to be protected against what they call counterfeiters of their 
products that have legitimately acquired secondary meaning. 
This TrafFix case obviously is of great concern because in one 
situation – and I would appreciate the panel’s advice – the feature 
that gives the product its uniqueness and its acceptance in the 
market, unlike the marketing device case, is invisible.  You can’t 
see it, it is buried within the product, but it enables the product to 
achieve the distinctive look that the public now identifies with the 
source of the product. 
So my question is: Does the fact that there is a utility patent on 
that invisible feature prevent my client from enforcing its rights 
against an infringer? 
 
 
 192 See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 18:48 (discussing naked licensing). 
 193 See supra note 191. 
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MR. MITCHELL: That is essentially the Kellogg case.  One 
aspect of the Kellogg case was the machine that made the 
Shredded Wheat biscuits in a certain shape came into the public 
domain, and since that device came into the public domain, the 
product of that device did.  So I think it certainly is something you 
might have some problems with.  Even though the thing that was 
patented is invisible, if the appearance was created by something 
that was patented, it is grounds for an argument. 
MS. FAYENSON: But that it comes into the public domain is 
not necessarily the law.  I am very interested in that situation, 
because maybe that is just the right case, where you do not see the 
functional feature at all, but it is the look that becomes distinctive 
and truly should be protectable under trademark law. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Are you saying the look was 
dependent upon the utility patent, that the look derives directly 
from enforcement of the utility patent? 
MR. GARRETT: We would argue that there are alternative ways 
to achieve the look.  Indeed, we are making that argument in the 
Trademark Office.  But it would seem to me, as I read TrafFix, that 
may not be the case. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Everyone who uses your patent that 
has expired will get the same look automatically.  Is that the 
scenario? 
MR. GARRETT: They might be able to.  That is right.  They 
might be able to get that look after the patent expired. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Well, that’s problematic. 
MR. GARRETT: And they might be able to get that look today 
by some alternative design. 
MR. SAIDMAN: The Supreme Court has not gotten that far.  
And even if they adopted my radical view, which is doubtful, but if 
they did, I would say that the way to test it would be to look at the 
patent claims and see what subject matter is actually in the public 
domain, and that subject matter is free to be made by anyone. 
Now, the issue is: Can it look like yours or must it look like 
someone else’s?  And if you cannot really see the functional 
components, then you might have a sliver of an argument that the 
exterior look is protectable and you can develop secondary 
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meaning in it, because it does not depend on the subject matter that 
is in the public domain by virtue of the expired claims. 
MS. FAYENSON: Is the only function of that invisible feature 
to give the product that look, or does it do other stuff within the 
product? 
MR. GARRETT: I think, in all fairness, it is probably the 
principal feature.  It enables the product to be distinctive and 
achieve the secondary meaning. 
MR. SAIDMAN: Well, then I change my mind.  Good question, 
counselor. 
PROFESSOR HANSEN: Any further questions?  Well, I think 
that is the last word.  I want to thank the panelists for their 
excellent and interesting presentations. 
MR. GALBRAITH: Thank you again to all the panelists and 
attendees for participating. 
 
